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172 MICHIGAN LAW RE VIEW
Rz-WRITING THz STATUTE Or FRAUDS: PART PRFORMANCE Ex Equ Ty--
One of the most striking examples of judicial legislation is that process
whereby courts of equity, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards,
have in no small measure re-written the Statute of Frauds. Exception was
added to exception until the doctrine kmown as "part performance" became
firmly established. The doctrine was not evolved consistently and the basis
of some applications of it is obscure. One who follows Sir Edward Frys
admirable but futile attempt (Fry, SPECHsc P, ounxce (ed. 5) §§ 58o, if-)
to systematize the variant decisions of the English courts must feel doubt-
ful whether any single theory will explain all the intricacies of part per-
NOTE AND COMMENT
formance. Mr. Pomeroy sought to support the doctrine upon the all-em-
bracing principle of fraud (Pomeroy, CONTRACTS (ed. 2) §§ io3, io4), but
unless it be fraud to fail to carry out a promise deliberately made when
another has acted upon it, this explanation fails.
The Statute of Frauds (1677) was scarcely installed in the statute
book, when LoRD JErraiES, C., in Butcher v. Stapely, (I685), I Vernon 363,
constructed an exception. Under a contract of sale the purchaser was let
into possession and the Lord Chancellor declared that "inasmuch as pos-
session was delivered according to the agreement he took the bargain to be
executed" and the statute did not apply. No reason is disclosed for this
holding, unless it be that a contract executed upon one side is not within
the contemplation of the statute: a dogma that cannot seriously be main-
tained. Subsequent decisions, however, followed Butcher v. Stapely with
alacrity and it has long been settled law in England and most American
jurisdictions that the receipt of possession from vendor or lessor takes the
case out of the statute in favor of the vendee or lessee. Ames, CASES
EQUITY, 279, n. 1. and cases cited. It is difficult to see what principle of
equity underlies this exception and efforts to support it rationally have been
singularly unhappy. Cf. JzssE, M. R. in Ungley v. Ungley, L. R. 5 Ch. D.
887, 89o; CoomLY, J., in Lamb v. Hiuman, 46 Mich. 112, 116. Modem judges
have been inclined to recognize that the exception of possession is exceed-
ingly arbitrary and rests upon nothing more than authority and history. See
the remark of Lord BLACKBUPNX in Madison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas.
467, 489, and WVLS, J., in Glass v. Hulbert, IO2 Mass. 32-34. Indeed a
number of American courts have declined to admit that mere possession is
sufficient, i6 MicH. L. Rrv. 154, 155.
Probably to prevent the multiplication of arbitrary exceptions the prin-
ciple was introduced that the alleged act of part performance must be of
such a nature that it would in and of itself indicate unequivocally the existence
of some contract concerning the particular land in question; parol evidence
might then be admitted to show the nature of that contract. (Sir WLLIm
GRANT, iM. R, in Framw v. Dawson, 14 Ves. 386.) Lord SrLBOURN sought to
give a truly equitable flavor to this principle by adding that, once such an act
is established, the enquiry must be directed to the respective equities of the
parties. In his view the matter must have passed beyond the stage of mere
contract through the altered situation of one of the parties produced by acts
done in reliance upon the contract. "The choice is between undoing what
has been done * * * and completing what has been left undone." Maddison v.
Alderson, supra. Obviously this will depend upon striking a nice balance.
But Lord Sg.noume's theory holds small comfort for a plaintiff in a common
type of case. If A promises B that if B will take care of him for the rest of
his life he (A) will leave Blackacre to B, a complete performance by B will
not justify specific performance. The performance by B does not point
unequivocally to any contract concerning Blackacre. The unfortunate position
of such a plaintiff has led some courts to give relief despite the statute; the
theory upon which this is most readily justified may be shortly described as
that of 'irreparable injury.' This theory has been attributed to Lord CoTTrEN-
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1LA (Cf. Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 Mylne & Craig 167), though it is doubtful if
he ever applied it to a case of the type under discussion; it seems to underlie
the well-known case of Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sand. Ch. 279, which is the lead-
ing authority in this country against the doctrine of Maddison v. Alderson.
It must be evident that the theory of Lord CoTruNHA., thus applied, is in-
consistent with that of Lord SV1.BOURNe. The tendency of the more recent
decisions seems to be in the direction of respecting the statute; Rhodes v.
Rhodes, for example, would probably not be followed in New York today.
Riusell v. Briggs, 165 N. Y. Soo. Moreover there is observable a healthy
effort to support such exceptions as remain upon some sound equitable basis.
Unfortunately this is not true of all courts. A number of recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of Michigan have dealt with part performance without
disclosing any principle of decision. In Fowler v. Isbel (i918) 168 N. W.
414, BROOIE, J., relied upon Friend'v. Smith, 191 Mich. 99, and in Broineling
v. Bromeling (1918) 168 N. W. 431 KUHN, J_, observed that Ruch v. Ruch,
159 Mich. 231, had settled the question. Ruch v. Ruch appears to invoke the
doctrine of fraud by the somewhat vague statement that the Statute of Frauds
is not a shield to protect fraud. Friend v. Smith cites a long line of Mich-
igan cases, a number of which are not in point. (e. g., Taiss v. George, 33
Mich. 253, Taft v. Taft, 73 Mich. 502, in neither of which was the statute
pleaded.) Those which are pertinent to the present discussion exhibit two
common characteristics: (i). They dicuss in great detail the evidence pre-
sented, and rest content therewith. It is of course eminently proper that the
court should satisfy itself that an oral contract is well established by the
evidence; but upon no principle of equity can a contract be enforced merely
because it is properly proven. Yet simply because the evidence was taken
to establish the contract, specific performance was granted in Fairfield v.
Barbour, 94 Mich. 152; Welch. v. Whelpley, 62 Mich. 15, and Russell v. Russell,
94 Mich. 122. (2). In the second place, there is no adequate discussion of
the principles underlying part performance nor is reference made to the
decisions of other jurisdictions wherein such principles might be found. In
Pike v. Pike, 121 Mich. 170, it is said that if a contract is "substantially
executed it is taken out of the statute." In Kinyon v. Young, 44 Mich. 339,
Cooaty, J., concedes that to make out his case the complainant must show
"such acts of part performance as will justify its (the contract's) enforce-
ment notwithstanding the failure to comply with the statute of frauds in
making it" He seems, however, to feel it unnecessary to define what part
performance is, to justify it by equitable theory, or to cite any adjudication
upon the point. Further, after admitting that the "acts (i. e-, of part per-
formance) are not as conclusive as could be desired," he assents to the con-
clusion of the lower court that "there have not only been acts of part per-
formance but that the contract has been completely performed * * * and
nothing remains to make out the case of the complainant" Where Judge
Cooi.ey led the way, his successors readily followed; and thoughcounsel from
time to time have endeavored to lure the court into a discussion of familiar
cases decidedly by courts of other states and England, the judges have de-
dined the invitation. This would be well enough if the court had once for
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all examined the problem of part performance in its equitable aspects and
determined upon some theory which it proposed to maintain. In such an
inquiry it is submitted that a consideration of the classic cases would do no
harm. The policy of the court has been otherwise. If there exist carefully
reasoned decisions in Michigan dealing with this problem, the Supreme
Court at its last term did not call attention to them. It is not pretended that
Fowler v. Isbell and Brorneling v. Brorneling, supra, are erroneously decided
or that the result does not make for 'justice;' but it is justice without law.
It may be desirable to repeal the Statute of Frauds, though that is scarcely
the function of a court of equity. It may even be desirable that new excep-
tions should be introduced by the courts, but if this is to be done, may one
not hope that the court will somehow gain a perspective larger than is
afforded by the 'equities' of any particular case? Is it too much to ask that
the profession be given something more than a series of decisions on "the
facts?" W. T. B.
